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Uniform Working Hours and Structural Unemployment∗
Abstract
In this paper, we construct a simple model based on heterogeneity in workers’ productivity and
homogeneity in their working schedules. This simple model can generate unemployment, even if
wages adjust instantaneously, ﬁrms are perfectly competitive, and ﬁrms can perfectly observe workers’
productivity and eﬀort. In our model, it is optimal for low-skilled workers to be unemployed because,
on the one hand, ﬁrms do not ﬁnd it optimal to hire low-skilled workers when labor hours must
be synchronized across heterogeneous workers, and on the other hand, low-skilled workers do not
ﬁnd it attractive working for the same hours as high-skilled workers at competitive wages based
on productivity. Thus our model oﬀers an alternative explanation for why unskilled workers are a
primary source of structural unemployment. (JEL classiﬁcation:E 0 ,J 6 . )
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Unskilled workers are a primary source of structural unemployment. It is well documented
that the unemployment rate of unskilled workers is much higher and more sensitive to the
business cycle than that of skilled workers (e.g., Nickell and Bell, 1996; Bowlus et al., 2001).1
The conventional wisdom regarding structural unemployment explains it as wage rigidity
(e.g., the eﬃciency wage theory). But no satisfactory explanations exist in this literature
for why unskilled workers are more likely to be unemployed than skilled workers. Existing
studies generally attribute the diﬀerence in unemployment rate between the skilled and un-
skilled workers to a weaker labor demand of unskilled workers. This interpretation, however,
depends implicitly on the assumption that wages for unskilled workers are stickier than wages
for skilled workers, or that the eﬃciency wage premium is higher for low-skilled workers than
it is for skilled workers. Few empirical studies, however, have been carried out to test or to
support this assumption.
Standard textbook explanations for why unskilled workers are more likely to contribute
to structural unemployment are rarely available, and if available, they also tend to be very
vague and not compelling. A typical statement in this regard can be found in Abel and
Bernanke (2001, p95):
“...unskilled or low-skilled workers often are unable to obtain desirable, long-
term jobs. The jobs available to them typically oﬀer relatively low wages and
little chance for training or advancement. Most directly related to the issue of
1 Also, using the 1993 U.S. Current Population Survey March Supplement, the unemployment rate for
prime age male without ﬁnishing high school is 13.86%, while the unemployment rate is only 6.24% for those
who graduated from high schools.
1structural unemployment is the fact that jobs held by low-skilled workers often
don’t last long. After a few months the job may end, or the worker may quit
or be ﬁred, thus entering another spell of unemployment.... Because of factors
such as inadequate education, discrimination, and language barriers, some un-
skilled workers never make the transition to long-term employment and remain
chronically unemployed.”
The implicit explanation in the quoted passage is that low-skilled workers can only ﬁnd
short-term jobs, since long-term jobs require skills or speciﬁc human capital. According to
this explanation, however, unemployment due to the lack of skills should be characterized
not as structural but frictional unemployment, because if it is true that short-term jobs end
more quickly and more frequently than long-term jobs do, then the major reason for unskilled
workers to be unemployed is that they are forced more frequently to enter the job search
process, contributing to frictional unemployment. This is obviously not the conclusion the
the above message intends to reach, as chronic unemployment due to lack of skills is diﬀerent
from frictional unemployment due to search. This leaves the quoted passage with the only
logical implication for the higher rates of unemployment of unskilled workers: there are fewer
short-term jobs available than long-term jobs.
Thus, existing studies and conventional wisdom alike generally attribute, in one way or
another, implicitly or explicitly, the diﬀerence in the unemployment rates between the skilled
and unskilled workers to the weaker labor demand of unskilled workers, without oﬀering an
explicit explanation as to why a lower demand for labor necessarily leads to a higher rate
of unemployment. Unless wages are stickier (or the eﬃciency wage premium is higher) for
2the unskilled workers, equilibrium in the labor market always equates supply and demand.
Hence a lower labor demand or a lower wage rate does not by itself explain a higher rate of
unemployment.
In this paper, we oﬀer a simple model to explain the aforementioned facts without re-
sorting to wage stickiness or the eﬃcient wage theory. The core of our explanation is based
on the stylized fact that working hours of both skilled and low-skilled workers are highly
synchronized. For example, managers, secretaries, technicians, and workers all work during
the same hours in a day and during the same days in a week (e.g., from 8:00 am to 5:00 PM
in a day and from Monday to Friday in a week).2
Costa (2000) has documented that the distribution of daily working hours are highly
compressed. For men aged 25-64, the diﬀerence between the 90th percentile and the 10th
percentile of the daily working hours distribution is only 2 hours in both 1973 and 1991.
Moreover, she also ﬁnds that the daily working hours of median workers are the same as
those of workers at the 10th percentile in the distribution. Using the most recent 1999 US.
Current Population Survey (CPS) March Supplement ﬁle, we ﬁnd that only 8.45% of the
prime age (24-64) males worked less than 8 hours per day while more than 91% worked 8
hours per day or longer.
There is no doubt that the synchronization of working hours is due at least partly to
biological reasons. For example, it is only natural for people to sleep at night and work
during daytime. Hence, working for 4 hours in the morning and 4 hours in the afternoon
with a lunch break in the middle appears to be a natural arrangement. However, there also
2 Costa (2000, p160) claims that the most common pattern of work is to begin at 8 A.M. and end at 5
P.M. from Monday to Friday.
3exist important economic reasons for adopting a uniform working schedule. For example,
accomplishing a task requires the coordination of many workers of diﬀerent skill levels during
the same period of time (think of the operation of an assembly line). Such arrangement
reduces not only coordination costs but also many other sorts of ﬁxed production costs (e.g.,
management costs, utility bill costs and other types of costs associated with operation of
capital). This interpretation is consistent with Costa’s (2000, p178) arguments. She claims
that the egalitarian hours distribution is the result of coordination of work activities within
and across ﬁrms. Moreover, Costa also points out that the synchronization of leisure-time
activities might also be the reason for the compression of daily working hours distribution.
When workers diﬀer in their skill levels (productivity), highly synchronized working time
has an important consequence: it creates unemployment. And it turns out that it is the low-
skilled workers who are more likely to be unemployed than skilled workers in a competitive
labor market with synchronized working hours.
The intuition is as follows. Due to the heterogeneity of skills, competitive wage rates
(measured by workers’ marginal productivity) diﬀer across workers. Suppose all workers
share the same propensity to work. They will then opt to supply a diﬀerent number of hours
in response to diﬀerent wage rates, with low-skilled workers working for fewer hours and
high-skilled workers working for longer hours. The synchronization of the working schedule,
however, requires that all types of workers work for the same length of time regardless of
skills, say 8 hours per day or 40 hours per week. Low-skilled workers may therefore ﬁnd the
required working hours far longer than preferred at the competitive wage rates measured
by marginal product. On the other hand, it is not in the ﬁrm’s interest to pay the low-
4skilled workers at a wage rate above their marginal product in order to entice them to work
for longer hours than they prefer. Consequent l y ,u n e m p l o y m e n tw i l lf a l lu p o nl o w - s k i l l e d
workers, and only low-skilled workers are willing to accept part-time jobs.3
A synchronized working scheme thus creates a dilemma: low-skilled workers would choose
to work if the wages were high enough to match their utility cost, which few ﬁrms would
like to oﬀer since they are above the workers’ marginal products; or they could work for
fewer hours at the market determined wages, which is diﬃcult for ﬁrms, however, due to the
synchronization of working schedules among workers.4 Our theory thus predicts that there
exists a natural rate of structural unemployment due to synchronization of working hours,
and that part-time jobs of various duration, if available, are more likely to be occupied by
unskilled workers.5 A l s o ,i ti sj u s tan a t u r a lc o n s e q u e n c eof our theory, without resorting to
the notions of sticky wages or eﬃciency wages, that lower labor demand due to lower labor
3 Workers can also diﬀer in propensity to work (i.e., preferences). Similar arguments can show that workers
with lower propensity to work, given the same skill levels, will be more likely to become unemployed under the
scheme of synchronized working hours. Thus synchronized working hours can create unemployment as long as
people diﬀer, either in terms of propensity to work or in terms of skills of labor. To explain the phenomenon
that the rate of unemployment is higher for low-skilled workers than for high-skilled workers, we assume that
the variation in propensity to work is smaller than the variation in productivity or skills, although this does
not rule out the possibility that some workers are unemployed because of low propensity to work.
4 Even part-time jobs require synchronized working hours among the part-time workers. Hence the dilemma
does not go away completely by creating part-time jobs unless ﬁrms are capable of creating a whole spectrum
(continuum) of jobs with all possible lengths of working hours, each for one speciﬁc worker with a particular
level of skills. This, however, is obviously too costly for ﬁrms to implement since it undoes the beneﬁto f
synchronization - to exploit the complementarity of labor and to reduce the cost of coordination among workers
of diﬀerent skills. This is perhaps why part-time jobs are not as common as full-time jobs in manufacturing
industries where the degree of labor complementarity and the coordination costs of labor are high. And
this is perhaps also the reason we rarely observe part-time jobs with arbitrary length, except in the service
sector where the intensity of capital service and the complementarity of labor are low (which implies that the
coordination cost is low).
5 The 1992 CPS data based on males of age 25-55 shows that in the year of 1991, among part-time workers,
24.25% are high school dropouts whereas among full-time workers that number is only 12.59%. The same
data also shows that among high school dropouts, 11.64% work as part-time workers whereas among high
school graduates that number is merely 5.32%.
5productivity is intrinsically associated with higher rates of unemployment. Our theory thus
has an important policy implication: a simple solution for reducing structural unemployment
is to create more part-time jobs with ﬂexible length of working hours. This solution is feasible,
however, only if coordination costs among diﬀerent workers can be reduced.6
The arguments presented in the paper are akin to the theory of indivisible labor (Hansen,
1985, and Rogerson, 1988). According to that theory, unemployment arises because people
can only choose to either work or not to work. Hence in equilibrium some individuals may
be unemployed. This theory, however, cannot explain the stylized fact that both the number
of employed people and the number of working hours are variable and highly volatile during
business cycles. In addition, it cannot explain why it is the low-skilled workers who are
more likely to be unemployed. In our model, both the rate of employment and the length
of synchronized working hours can vary in response to aggregate disturbances, and it is the
low skilled workers who are most sensitive to the business cycle. In other words, equilibrium
unemployment exists in our model not because of ex ante indivisibility of labor — in fact
working hours in our model are inﬁnitely divisible, but because of the synchronization of
working hours across heterogenous workers that gives rise ex post to a rigidity in the labor
market similar to that of indivisible labor. Hence the theory provided in this paper can be
viewed as a natural extension of the indivisible labor theory.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section
6 This explains why the service sector where the coordination cost is low due to low capital intensity is
an important sector for absorbing low skilled labor and for creating part-time jobs. With the development of
IT technology, which reduces coordination costs, more and more people can choose to work at home. This
should also prove useful in reducing structural unemployment. But this trend is so far associated only with
high-skilled workers, since operating computers at home requires skills.
63 proves the existence of equilibrium and derives the equilibrium unemployment rate — the
“natural rate”. A calibrated numerical example is given in Section 4. The case of indivisible
labor is discussed in Section 5, and section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
There is a continuum of agents distributed in the interval i ∈ [0,1], w o r k i n gf o rar e p r e s e n -
tative ﬁrm (say, a pin factory). They have identical propensity to work but diﬀer in their





If worker i gets to supply ni hours of labor, her contribution to output (intermediate goods)
is measured by a diminishing returns to scale technology:
yi = pif(ni),f 0 > 0,f00 ≤ 0. (2)
However, we assume that
1) The production technology is accessible to a worker only when the factory is open.
That is, there is some time when a factory is closed, and hence inaccessible to labor. Output
can only be generated when the factory is open, so even hired labor is unproductive unless
it is present when the factory is open.
2) Workers are substitutable ex ante but become complementary ex post.T h a ti s ,o n c e
a worker is hired, her labor input is essential for the production of not only her own output,
but also of everybody else’s output in the factory. In other words, labor of diﬀerent skills are
complementary to each other at the work place (imagine workers being assigned to diﬀerent
7positions on an assembling line), so that labor is productive only when all other employed
workers are present simultaneously during the factory’s open hours.
These assumptions suggest that we can rewrite the production function as a Leontief
type technology:
yi = pif(min{n0,...,n j,...,n I,N});
where N is the factory’s operation time, which can also be interpreted as capital’s working
hours, and I ∈ [0,1] is the cut-oﬀ skill level hired by the ﬁrm, which can also be interpreted
as the employment rate. This production function implies that a worker’s labor productivity
is zero if the factory does not open (assumption 1). In addition, it implies that a worker’s
marginal product is zero if her working hours exceed the minimum working hours of other
employed workers (assumption 2). Hence, as in Adam Smith’s pin factory, coordination of
labor of diﬀerent skills and synchronization of working hours are essential for production.7







pif(min{nj,N})di, j ∈ [0,I]. (3)
B o t ht h er a t eo fe m p l o y m e n t( I) and the factory’s hours of operation (N) are determined
by the ﬁrm in order to maximize proﬁt.
7 The Leontief technology assumption is quite extreme and it is made here for simplicity only. Basically,
what we want to show is that as long as there are beneﬁts associated with labor synchronization, then the
demand function for labor for each individual will be determined by the operation time of capital, N.T h u s ,
some workers must be unemployed if the optimal length of working hours determined by the ﬁrm exceeds
what the workers prefer.
8 Note that since we assume that the complementarity of labor among workers takes place only at the work-
ing site, hence unemployed workers do not aﬀect employed workers’ labor productivity because unemployed
workers do not take position on the assembly line.
8Cost minimization by the ﬁrm implies a perfect synchronization of working hours across
employees. Hence the demand for labor for each worker i is given by:
ni = N, for all i ≤ I;( 4 )
where {N,I} remain to be determined in equilibrium. Demand for labor follows such a
simple rule because working hours for each individual longer than others’have zero marginal
product and working hours shorter than others’would render any extra labor of the rest of
the employees unproductive. Thus, worker i’s eﬀective production function becomes:
yi = pif(N),





[pif(N) − wiN]di, (5)
where Π denotes proﬁt. We assume that the competitive real wage received by each employed
worker is determined by a simple marginal-product rule:9
wi = pif0(N). (6)
Given that all workers have the same upward-sloping labor supply function, ns(w), we
may denote the reservation wage for all types of workers as ¯ w(N). Hence, type i individual
will accept a job and become employed if pif0(N) ≥ ¯ w(N), and will not accept the job and
9 Note that the externality among workers appears to give workers the power to bargain for shares of
output. However, since we assume that a worker has access to the production technology only after she is
hired, it is therefore the ﬁrm that has the power to internalize and exploit the externality, provided that ﬁrms
are able to replace immediately any workers who quit, which we assume in the paper.
9hence become unemployed if pif0(N) < ¯ w(N).10
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the point. The upward sloping line in ﬁgure 1 represents the
labor supply curve that is assumed to be the same across all agents i ∈ [0,1]. The downward
sloping lines represent labor demand curves for agents with diﬀerent productivity levels. The
demand for labor is obviously weaker for lower-productivity workers at any given wage rates.
But this alone does not necessarily give rise to unemployment. Notice that if working hours
are not required to be synchronized across agents, competitive equilibrium then implies that
all agents are employed regardless of their skill levels. In such an equilibrium each worker
has her own speciﬁc length of working hours, and workers diﬀer only in the length of working
hours and in wage rates, not in their employment status. In ﬁgure 1, for example, agent i0
works for n0 hours, agent I works for N hours, and agent i1 works for n1 hours, etc.
Coordination costs and complementarity of labor, however, make it extremely costly for
ﬁrms to oﬀer a complete spectrum of working hours according to each individual’s produc-
tivity. Cost minimization requires synchronization of labor, implying that workers cannot
work for any arbitrary hours of their desired labor supply at the competitive wage rates
based on their productivity. They must either work for the same length of time as the others
do during the factory’s operation hours or not work at all. Consequently, there may exist
10 In order to simplify our analyses without loss of generality, we assume that the reservation wage is
determined by the inverse labor supply function w(N), implying that staying unemployed receives higher
utility than working for hours longer than preferred. This assumption can be easily relaxed using explicit
utility maximization without aﬀecting the major conclusions reached (see section 5 for such an analysis). For
the same purpose, we also assume that “part-time” jobs with hours shorter than N are not available in the
model. It is straightforward to extend the model to allow for part-time working hours. The major insight
of our theory continues to hold as long as there also exists synchronization in labor hours for the part-time
jobs. In reality, although part-time jobs do exist, they are not all set for arbitrary lengths of time. Namely,
there still exists synchronized minimum hours during which people are required to work for in part-time jobs
unless capital and coordination are not required.
10unemployment. Figure 2, for example, shows that agent i0 is unemployed because her labor
supply curve intersects with her labor demand curve at a location that is below the uniform
working hours N. At the uniform working hours (N), agent i0
0s utility cost is W,w h i c h
exceeds the competitive real wage she receives (i.e., W0). In fact, all workers with skills close
to type i0 agent can aﬀord only “part-time” jobs (with hours less than N) at the compet-
itive wage rates measured by their marginal product of labor, although they are certainly
interested in (or looking for) “full-time” jobs that can pay them wages that match their
disutility of working. Hence they satisfy the deﬁnition of structural unemployment given by
the literature.
In ﬁgure 2, only type I or type i1 agents are employed, where I is also the optimal rate of
employment to be determined by the proﬁt-seeking ﬁrm along with the synchronized working
hours N. Competitive real wages paid to employed workers obviously diﬀer across workers’
types due to heterogeneity in productivity. Some of them (say agent i1)m a yﬁnd the wage
rates (e.g., W1) so attractive (as it is far above their marginal disutility of working) that
they are willing to supply hours much longer than N but can nevertheless work only for N
hours. In fact, all employed workers except the cut-oﬀ type (I) work for wage rates above
their labor supply curve. Note that wages paid to employed workers are also higher than
their respective market-clearing levels. For example, agent i1 receives real wage W1 from the
representative ﬁrm while her market-clearing real wage (determined by equating supply and
demand of labor with respect to type i1 agents) is between W1 and W. The cut-oﬀ agent I is
the only exception, with her received real wage just equal to the market-clearing level (W).
This feature of the model that received wages are above market clearing wages is reminis-
11cent of the eﬃciency-wage literature (see Yellen, 1984, Katz, 1986, and Akerlof and Yellen,
1986 for surveys and references), although arising for an entirely diﬀerent reason. In our
model, equilibrium wage rates being higher than market clearing wages for high-skilled work-
ers is purely because of the synchronization of working hours, not because of any incentive
problems due to unobservable work eﬀort or productivity. Similarly, the fact that low-skilled
workers are unemployed in our model is not because of weaker demand for low-skilled labor
per se, but because of the synchronization in working hours that results in wages paid to
low-skilled workers (e.g., W0) being below their least acceptable levels (i.e., W).
Whether unemployment in this model is “voluntary” or “involuntary”, therefore, depends
purely on the point of view. It is “voluntary” in the sense that low-productivity workers (such
as those represented by i0)r e f u s et ot a k eaj o bw o r k i n gf o rN hours and being paid at the
competitive wage, W0, which is below their disutility of working (W). It is “involuntary”,
on the other hand, in the sense that ﬁrms refuse to hire the low-skilled workers (such as
i0) according to their reservation wages (such as W) or to any perceived market prevailing
wages.11
3 Equilibrium
Equilibrium is deﬁned as a pair of synchronized working hours and the rate of employment,
{N∗,I∗}, that maximizes ﬁrm’s proﬁt. In this section, we prove the existence of equilibrium
and we conduct comparative statics with respect to changes in technology parameters.
11 By deﬁnition, a worker is said to be “involuntarily unemployed” if she is willing to work at the market-
prevailing wage but cannot ﬁnd a job. In our model, the market-prevailing wages are the wage rates paid to
the employed workers (e.g., anywhere between W and W1). Since the market-prevailing wage rates are above
the unemployed workers’ marginal products, these workers cannot ﬁnd jobs.
12Proposition 1 If the supply of labor is an increasing function of the real wage (upward
sloping), then for any given uniform working hours N>0, there exists a cut-oﬀ point I(N),
such that worker i is unemployed if i>I(N), a n de m p l o y e di fi ≤ I(N).
Proof. Let ws(n) be the inverse labor supply function of type i worker (the reservation
wage). Since the labor supply of the cut-oﬀ type I is exactly the same as her labor demand,
we have:
pIf0(N)=ws(N). (7)
Equation (7) determines the cut-oﬀ type’s productivity as a function of the synchronized
working hours N :
pI = ws(N)/f0(N),f 0(N) > 0. (8)
Since the index function pI is a function of I, the cut-oﬀ point I(N) is therefore implicitly
determined. ¥
For any employed worker with i<I(N), her real wage exceeds her reservation wage:
pif0(N) >w s(N), (9)
and her equilibrium labor supply is given by ni = N. For any unemployed worker with
i>I(N), her equilibrium labor supply is zero.
The cut-oﬀ point, I(N), measures the rate of employment given N. It is a decreasing
function of the synchronized working hours N since equation (8) implies that the cut-oﬀ
worker’s productivity p is increasing in N. The intuition is that only higher-productivity
workers are willing to work for longer hours at the competitive wage rates, consequently less
people are attracted to work as the working hours increase.
13Proposition 2 Deﬁne the cumulative product index as P(N) ≡
R I(N)
i=0 pidi ≥ 0, the elasticity
of the cumulative product with respect to the factory operation time N as ε(N) ≡
P0(N)N
P(N) ,
and the elasticity of a worker’s output with respect to hours, α ≡
f0(N)N
f(N) . Assume that α is
constant. An optimal synchronization time N∗ exists and is determined by the condition:
−ε(N)=α. (10)










where wi is deﬁned by (6), the cut-oﬀ point I(N) is determined by (8), and α ∈ (0,1] is the
constant output elasticity of hours.12 Using the deﬁnition for the cumulative productivity
index, P, the proﬁt maximization program can then be rewritten as
max
N
Π =( 1 − α)f(N)P(N). (12)
Without loss of generality, assume f(N)=0f o rN =0 , and I(N)=0f o rN ≥ M<∞.
Since the proﬁt function is non-negative over the domain N ∈ R+ and it takes zero values at
the two points, N = {0,M}, a maximum therefore exists in the open interval N ∈ (0,M).









or α = −ε(N).¥
12 When the production function is linear (α =1 ) , the objective function can be deﬁned as maximizing
total revenue rather than total proﬁt.
14This optimal condition says that, given that the ﬁrm must choose a uniform working
hours (N) across all types of agents with diﬀerent skill levels, N should be chosen at the
point where the elasticity of cumulative product with respect to hours (the percentage loss
of aggregate output due to the loss of the number of employees as working hours increase)
is equal to the elasticity of individual output (the percentage gain in individual’s production
as working hours increase).
To understand this condition, notice that the proﬁt function, Π =( 1− α)f(N)P(N),
is a combination of output due to per-worker quantity (f(N)) and an index of aggregate
quantity (P) of all employees. The quantity per worker increases with hours worked per
person (f0(N) > 0). The aggregate quantity of all employees (P), however, decreases with
hours worked per person because longer uniform working hours imply that fewer workers are
employed under competitive real wages, hence the aggregate product index, P =
R I
i=0 pidi,
decreases. (Note P0(N)=P0(I)I0(N) < 0s i n c eI0(N) < 0). Increasing working hours in the




where the ﬁrst term measures the marginal gain given the number of employees, and the
second term measures the marginal loss due to a reduction in the rate of employment as
working hours increase.
Proposition 3 If P00N
P0 > −(1 + α), then the equilibrium is unique.
Proof. Diﬀerentiating equation (13) again gives
d2Π
dNdN


















f0 = α − 1, P0N














if and only if P00N
P0 > −(1 + α). ¥
The intuition for the condition, P00N
P0 > −(1 + α), is that we require that the loss of
cumulative product due to the loss of low-skilled workers caused by an increase in the uni-
form working hours does not accelerate too fast when N increases, meaning that the cut-oﬀ
function I does not decrease too fast as N increases, or that the inverse labor supply curve
in ﬁgure 1 is not too steep. Suppose that the condition fails to hold, e.g., the inverse labor
supply curve in ﬁgure 1 is vertical, then we can imagine multiple or even a continuum of
equilibria for the cut-oﬀ function I.
The optimal rate of employment is then given by I(N∗), in which N∗ solve equation (10).
A “natural” rate of unemployment in the economy can then be deﬁned as
UNR =1− I(N∗), (18)
which depends on both preferences and technology parameters.
The following two propositions establish the direction of changes in both I and N when
technology parameters change. For that purpose, we introduce an aggregate technology
shifter A into the workers’ production function:
yi = Apif(N), (19)





Note that the cut-oﬀ condition implies that I is decreasing in N and that ∂I





dA > 0 if ∂2P
∂I2 ≤ 0. Namely, the response of N to changes in the aggregate
technology level is positive if the cumulative product index P is non-convex in I.
Proof. Rewrite the ﬁrst-order condition (10) as
αP(N,A)=−PN(N,A)N(A). (21)

































> 0 (Proposition 3).
We also know that PN < 0s i n c ePN = −α P
N as in (21). Hence,
dN
dA
> 0i fαPA + PNAN>0. (24)
But we know that PA = ∂P
∂I
∂I
∂A > 0, where ∂P
∂I > 0a n d ∂I
∂A > 0s i n c et h ec u t - o ﬀ worker’s
productivity p in (20) is decreasing in A holding N constant. Therefore, it suﬃces to require
only































Denote these two terms as PIIIAIN +PIINA,i nw h i c hw ek n o wIAIN < 0s i n c e ∂I
∂A > 0a n d
∂I
∂N < 0; and we also know PIINA > 0s i n c e∂P











where p is the cut-oﬀ worker’s productivity satisfying
∂2p
∂N∂A < 0 (see equation 20). Therefore,
PNA = PIIIAIN + PIINA > 0i fPII ≤ 0. ¥
This proposition is intuitive since a higher A raises each worker’s productivity. However,
if the second-order condition, PII ≤ 0, is not satisﬁed, then it is possible for N to decrease
in response to an increase in A, because in that case the ﬁrm opts to increase the number of
workers (I)b ys om u c ht h a ti tb e c o m e so p t i m a lf o rﬁrms to reduce operating hours N.
Proposition 5 dI









where εw > 0 is the wage elasticity of labor supply.









































dI < 0, the requirement dI








































f0 = α − 1. ¥
This proposition says that the rate of employment can also respond positively to the
aggregate technology shock A simultaneously with N if the supply of hours is suﬃciently
elastic (εw small). The intuition is that a higher aggregate technology raises the low-skilled
workers’ productivity, resulting in a higher rate of employment for the low-skilled workers,
provided that the corresponding increase in the uniform working hours is not too big to
curtail the positive eﬀect of technology on the employment rate. This would be the case if
the inverse labor supply curve is suﬃciently ﬂat or α is suﬃciently large so that the cut-oﬀ
function I is not too sensitive to changes in hours.
4A S p e c i ﬁcE x a m p l e
Consider a parameterized model economy. Let N be the uniform working hours, and let the
per-worker production function be given by yi = ApiNα, where A represents an aggregate
productivity shifter. In addition, let the productivity parameter of individual i follow pi =
1 − i,i ∈ [0,1], and the inverse labor supply function be given by
w = γ0 + γ1N. (31)
Suppose the cut-oﬀ worker type is I,t h e nw o r k e r sw i t hi ≤ I will be employed at wage rates
wi = αApiNα−1, and workers with i>Iwill be unemployed. Given N, the cut-oﬀ point I
is determined by the condition:






Each employed worker (i ≤ I) receives the real wage wi = αA(1 − i)Nα−1, which is greater
than the cut-oﬀ worker’s real wage by a factor of 1−i
1−I ≥ 1.









where I is given in (33). The ﬁrst order condition is




where εw > 0 is the elasticity of wage with respect to hours supply: w0N
w .












It is easy to see, however, that the rate of employment (I) and hours worked (N)c o m o v e
in response to aggregate technology shocks A, regardless of α. Diﬀerentiating both sides of











(2εw+2−α)3 > 0a n dε0
w(N)=
γ0
(γ0+γ1N)2 > 0. Hence the direction of changes in I
is the same as the direction of changes in N regardless of α. For this reason, we can assume
α = 1 without loss of generality, so as to gain further insight on the comovement of I and














, γ0 ≤ A. (40)




















0 +3 A2 > 0. (42)
It is a well documented stylized fact in the business cycle literature that both the rate
of employment and hours worked are procyclical (e.g., see Cho and Cooley, 1994). This is
consistent with the predictions of our model. A lower period of aggregate productivity induces
proﬁt-seeking ﬁrms to adjust downward both the number of employees and the number of
hours worked per person. Since it is the low-skilled workers who are exposed to the layoﬀ risk
when employment rate decreases, the unemployment rate of low skilled workers is therefore
more sensitive to the business cycle than that of skilled workers.
The relative magnitude of adjustment in the two diﬀerent margins (number of workers
and number of hours) in response to aggregate disturbances depend crucially on the slope of
13 The ﬁrm’s proﬁt is zero when the technology is linear. In that case, the total revenue rather than the
total proﬁt is being maximized.













A ﬂatter labor supply curve (a larger γ1) or a lower propensity to work (a larger γ0)i m p l i e s
more volatile employment rate relative to hours worked during the business cycle. Given
the status quo of the labor supply curve, however, a lower level of aggregate productivity
implies relatively smaller reactions from hours worked to business cycle shocks than that
from employment rate. This prediction is interesting as it indicates that developed economies
would have a higher volatility in hours worked but a lower volatility in employment rate than
underdeveloped economies, as the impact of technology shocks would be mostly absorbed by
hours worked in economies where aggregate productivity level is high.
T h eC a s eo fI n d i v i s i b l eL a b o r—In the above discussions, we have considered synchronized
working schedule due solely to cost minimization from the ﬁrm side, but synchronization of
working hours can also be due to biological reasons (e.g., it is only natural for the human body
to sleep during the night and work during the day). Suppose that for biological reasons only
two discrete choices of hours exist: either working for ¯ N hours or not working at all. What
are the consequences of indivisible labor on employment when workers are heterogenous in
their skill levels?








N = {0, ˆ N}. (45)
22The solution is obviously N = ˆ N, since the proﬁti sz e r ow h e nN =0 . Hence equation (20)
or (33) suﬃces for determining the equilibrium level of employment in the model, which is










, γ0 <A . (46)
Note that both the aggregate technology (A) and the length of working hours ( ˆ N)a ﬀect
the equilibrium rate of employment. Since hours are indivisible, the adjustment of output
in response to aggregate technology shock (A) falls entirely upon the rate of employment
I. In particular, the employment rate decreases as A decreases. Again, in this model,
unemployment falls upon the low-skilled workers because of the synchronization of labor.
Obviously, any model with the assumption of indivisible labor hours cannot explain why
hours also respond to business cycle disturbances. It is hence more likely that biological
factors, institutional factors, and production coordination all play a role in synchronizing
people’s working schedules. For example, biological or institutional factors allow people to
work for 8 hours per day and 40 hours per week on average, but for reasons of production
coordination and proﬁt maximization, ﬁrms can adjust the actual working hours up or down
(say between 35 and 45 hours per week) in response to business conditions.
5R o b u s t n e s s
In this section, we prove that explicitly taking into account workers’ utility function in
determining their labor supply behavior does not alter the conclusions reached in this paper,
as long as the utility function is consistent with an upward-sloping labor supply curve (i.e.,
the substitution eﬀect dominates the income eﬀect). The crucial thing to check is that
such considerations do not aﬀect the main features of the cut-oﬀ function (I)w h i c hw e r e
23determined previously by the condition:
pIf0(N)=wI(N), (47)
where the right hand side is the real wage determined by the marginal product, and the
left-hand side is the worker’s inverse labor supply function. There are two major properties
implied by this condition which were used previously to prove propositions (2)-(5). The ﬁrst
property is that
dpI
dN > 0, which also implies dI
dN < 0s i n c epI is decreasing in I. The second
property is that the cumulative productivity index, P ≡
R I(N)
i=0 pidi, is decreasing in N :
dP
dN > 0. This is a natural consequence of dI
dN < 0.
Let the index number (employment rate) that solves condition (47) be I1. The assump-
tion behind condition (47) for being a marginal condition is that workers are better oﬀ by
not working than working for more hours than desired. We show here that relaxing this
assumption does not change anything qualitatively except that the newly determine cut-oﬀ
point ( call it I2)l i e sa b o v eI1, the original cut-oﬀ point determined from (47). The intuition
for I2 >I 1 is that workers with indices immediately above I1 (i.e., with labor demand curves
lie immediately below worker I1)m a ya l s oﬁnd working for N hours more attractive than not
working at all, although N exceeds their desired labor supply. Workers with indices i>I 2,
however, deﬁnitely ﬁnd working not attractive as the utility received from working for N
hours is less than that from not working at all.
Consider the utility function for worker i ∈ [0,1] :
u(ci,1 − ni)=u(γ + wini,1 − ni),u 0
1,u 0
2 > 0,u 00
1,u 00
2 < 0; (48)
where ci = γ + wini is consumption, wi is the real wage, ni is the number of hours worked
24(the time endowment has been normalize to 1), and γ > 0 is the wealth level. The optimal




= u1−n(ci,n i), (49)
or
uc (γ + wini,1 − n)w = u1−n (γ + wini,1 − n). (50)
Let wi = pif0(ni),i= I1, and ni = N, (50) becomes exactly the condition (47) which was
used to determine the cut-oﬀ point I1 previously in the paper, provided that the inverse
labor supply function w(ni) as an implicit solution to (50) exists and is unique. But (50) is
no longer the right condition for determining the cut-oﬀ point in the current case, as some
workers with i>I 1 may also prefer working to not working. The right condition is given by
u
¡
γ + pif0(N)N,1 − N
¢
≥ u(γ,1). (51)
Namely, facing the synchronized working hours N, the individual will choose to work if and
only if the utility received from working for N hours exceeds the utility of not working at
all. Hence, a cut-oﬀ point I2(N) exists and is determined implicitly by the equation,
u
¡
γ + pI2f0(N)N,1 − N
¢
= u(γ,1). (52)








<u 1−n(c,N), if i>I 1; (54)
25namely, for a worker i (≤ I1) whose desired labor supply is greater than that of the marginal
worker I1 which is determined by (50), increasing her working hours beyond N increases her
utility; and for a worker (i>I 1) whose desired labor supply is less than that of the marginal
worker I1, increasing her working hours beyond N decreases her utility.





Now totally diﬀerentiating the cut-oﬀ equation (52) with respect to N, realizing that I =









= u1−N (cI2,N). (56)








This completes the proof.
Figure 3 illustrates the idea fully, where the rays represent budget constraints for diﬀerent
types with diﬀerent wage income, and the convex curves represents indiﬀerence curves. Note
that agent I1 has desired labor supply just equal to her labor demand at N, but she is no
longer the cut-oﬀ type. The cut-oﬀ type (or the employment rate) is determined instead by
agent I2 who is just indiﬀerent between working for N hours and not working at all.
266C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, a simple model is proposed to explain certain forms of structural unemploy-
ment, without resorting to conventional labor-market frictions such as sticky wages or im-
perfect information on workers’ productivity. The theory is built on two commonly observed
facts. First, working schedules are highly synchronized across labor. For example, in the
1890s, about 47% of male workers in the U.S. worked 10 hours per day and “the most com-
mon pattern was for work to begin at 7:00 A.M. and end at 5:30 P.M. with a 30-minute break
for lunch” (Costa 2000, p159). One hundred years later, the degree of synchronization had
become even stronger. In 1991, 57% of male workers in the US. reported that they worked 8
hours per day, and the most common pattern was from 8:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M. (Costa 2000,
p160). The second observation is that workers are heterogeneous in their skill levels, some
being more productive than others (this is true even for workers in the same department
working on similar tasks). Diﬀerences in productivity imply diﬀerences in wages, which in
turn imply diﬀerences in hours supply. Synchronization of labor, however, requires the same
length of working hours. As a result, low-skilled workers are more likely to be unemployed
than skilled workers, given similar propensities to work, since ﬁrms cannot aﬀord to pay
low-skilled workers their reservation wages, which are above their marginal products.
Our analysis also shows that the rate of employment and the average hours worked per
worker can both respond to business cycle shocks in the same direction. During economic
booms, not only the average working hours (synchronized across workers) are longer, but
more people are also absorbed into the work force from the low end of the skill spectrum.
27The converse is also true during economic recessions. As a result, low-skilled workers are
more sensitive to the business cycle than skilled workers, as is observed in the US economy.
Since our model predicts that the rate of employment depends negatively on the length
of working hours, other things equal, an obvious policy implication of the model is this:
reducing the length of working hours or oﬀering part-time jobs can boost employment. The
reason is that more low-skilled workers are able to ﬁnd jobs when the working time shortens.
The French government, for example, has been pushing for a 35-hour work week against the
traditional 40-hour work week in an attempt to reduce unemployment. The welfare gain of
such policy, however, is not clear, since a shorter working time also causes a loss of aggregate
output as low-skilled labor hours replace high-skilled labor hours. Thus the situation depends
on the balance between the gains of output due to a higher rate of employment and the loss
of output due to a shorter working time.14 In future works, we hope to push for a carefully
evaluation of the welfare consequence of adopting shorter work week in an environment like
the one we have modeled here.
14 In addition, the high-skilled workers are worse oﬀ because they would rather work more hours at the
g i v e nw a g et h a nf e w e r .
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for n0 hours, agent I works for N hours, and agent i1 works for n1 hours.
30Figure 2. Labor market equilibrium when hours are synchronized at N,w h e r ew o r k e ri0 is
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31Figure 3. Labor market equilibrium when hours are synchronized, where worker i0 is
unemployed, workers I1 and i1 are employed, and worker I2 is the cut-oﬀ type.
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